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JAPAN’S GOVERNMENT PROCUREMENT 
REGIMES FOR PUBLIC WORKS: 
A COMPARATIVE INTRODUCTION 
Shigeki Kusunoki*
ABSTRACT 
n Japan, the Act for Promoting Quality Assurance in Public 
Works was enacted in spring 2005 and came into force soon 
thereafter. This is an epoch-making act in the history of Japanese pub-
lic procurement regimes and practices, mainly in that, with respect to 
bidding procedures: (1) it declares that a comprehensive evaluation 
method shall generally be used for public works; (2) it permits procur-
ing entities to dialogue with candidates to discuss improvement of their 
submitted technical proposals; and (3) it permits a cap on the estimated 
price to be set just before the scheduled date of bidding. The author 
will introduce Japan’s basic public procurement regimes and the Act’s 
impact on them, and describe Japan vis-à-vis the United States, Euro-
pean Union, and the Government Procurement Agreement of the 
World Trade Organization (WTO-GPA or GPA) on the issue of con-
tractor award processes. The hurdles for implementing the WTO-GPA 




As the result of the negotiations of the Uruguay Round for the Gen-
eral Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), as well as simultaneous 
multilateral trade negotiations, the Government Procurement Agree-
ment of the World Trade Organization (WTO)1 was signed in Marra-
kech, Morocco in 1994 and came into effect in January 1996.2 In De-
cember 1995, just before it came into force, Japan ratified and then 
promulgated the Agreement.3
                                                                                                               
 *  Associate Professor, Faculty of Law, Sophia University. The author thanks the 
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 1. Agreement on Government Procurement, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement 
Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 4(b), Legal Instruments—Results 
of the Uruguay Round, 33 I.L.M. 1125 (1994) [hereinafter GPA], available at 
http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/gpr-94_e.pdf. See generally SUE 
ARROWSMITH, GOVERNMENT PROCUREMENT IN THE WTO (2003) (discussing the GPA). 
 2. GPA, supra note 1, art. 24(1); ARROWSMITH, supra note 1, at 40. 
 3. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Notice on the GATT Agreement on Government 
Procurement, Notice No. 665 (Dec. 8, 1995) (effective from Jan. 1, 1996).  
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Ten years have passed since the GPA entered into force. Until today, 
the member countries, as well as observers like China, have reformed 
their domestic government procurement regimes in an attempt to im-
plement the GPA.4 Among them, Japan has grappled with many re-
forms and measures, including ones to tighten up the conditions for 
awards in cases of non-competitive tendering (single-source tender-
ing)5 and to establish bid-protest institutions.6
Remarkably, as in other member and observer countries, not only the 
need to implement the GPA to fulfill international treaty obligations, 
but also particular domestic considerations, provided the impetus for 
Japan’s recent legal and practical reforms with respect to public pro-
curement. Specifically, the reforms in Japan needed to address not only 
the country’s GPA obligations but also the country’s specific institu-
tional, historical, cultural, and social conditions, such as the group 
mentality deeply rooted in Japanese culture which has resulted in 
bid-rigging problems7 as well as the involvement of government offi-
cials in the majority of bid-rigging cases.8
As a starting point to address these obligations and specific condi-
tions in Japan, the Act for Promoting Quality Assurance in Public 
Works (APQA) was enacted in spring 2005.9 Although the immediate 
effect of this important Act is limited as it covers only public works, it 
has the strong potential to be a breakthrough for the necessary reform 
of Japanese public procurement laws, regulations, and practices in 
general. Among its most notable provisions, the Act provides that the 
 4. See, e.g., Christopher F. Corr & Kristina Zissis, Convergence and Opportunity: 
The WTO Government Procurement Agreement and U.S. Procurement Reform, 18 
N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 303 (1999) (discussing reforms in U.S. law to im-
plement the GPA); Tong Xinchao, Chinese Procurement Law: Current Legal 
Framework and a Transition to the World Trade Organization’s Government Pro-
curement Agreement, 17 TEMP. INT’L & COMP. L.J. 139 (2003) (discussing China’s 
efforts to bring its procurement laws more in line with the GPA). 
 5. See, e.g., Jean Heilman Grier, Japan’s Implementation of the WTO Agreement 
on Government Procurement, 17 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 605, 631–33 (1996). 
 6. Id. at 643–56. 
 7. See, e.g., Guy de Jonquieres, Take a Bite Out of Japan's Collusion Culture, FIN. 
TIMES, May 31, 2005, at 17. 
 8. Regarding recent cases government officials involved in bid-rigging cases, see, 
e.g., Bid-rigging Attitudes See Shift, YOMIURI SHIMBUN [DAILY YOMIURI] (Tokyo), 
Dec. 10, 2006, at 3. 
 9. Kokyokōji no hinshitsu kakuho no sokushin ni kansuru hōritsu [Act for Pro-
moting Quality Assurance in Public Works], Law No. 18 of 2005 [hereinafter APQA]. 
An English translation is available at the Web site of the Japanese Ministry of Land, 
Infrastructure and Transport, http://www.hrr.mlit.go.jp/gijyutu/hinkaku/html/hou-eng 
lish.html. 
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“comprehensive evaluation” method, and not the “price-only competi-
tion” method, is to be generally employed;10 procuring entities and 
candidates may discuss and make adjustments to the technical propos-
als in competitive bidding procedures;11 and the “maximum estimated 
price” usually set at the time of a bidding announcement may be set by 
procuring entities just before the date of bidding.12 Until the end of the 
last century, the main aims of reforming public works regimes were to 
enhance competitiveness and to deter misconduct, responding to criti-
cism against the frequent cases of bid rigging and bribery in the 1990s. 
After the enactment of the APQA, however, the movement for Japan’s 
procurement reforms could be boldly steered toward “flexibility” and 
“diversification.”13
This article aims at providing detailed information concerning the 
developments in Japan described above. It is hoped that this article will 
be useful to readers in deepening their understanding of Japan, and 
thereby contribute to smooth negotiations among WTO members. 
Moreover, it is hoped that the article will also be of use to academics 
and legal practitioners as a comparative analysis of laws and policies. 
Hereafter, Part II surveys and highlights the basic legal schemes for 
government procurement in Japan. Part III introduces the APQA and 
its legislative history. Next, Part IV compares the relevant laws in Ja-
pan, the United States, and the European Union, and discusses the an-
ticipated hurdles that Japan must overcome to implement the GPA 
fully. Finally, Part V contains the author’s conclusion. 
II. CONTRACTOR SELECTION PROCESSES IN JAPAN’S PUBLIC 
PROCUREMENT 
Generally speaking, there are two types of administrative agencies 
that handle government procurement, namely national agencies and 
local agencies. In Japan, different laws and regulations apply to the 
two types of administrative agencies. National agencies are regulated 
by the Accounting Act (AA)14 and its implementing Order Concerning 
 10. Id. art. 3; see infra Part III.B.3. 
 11. APQA, supra note 9, art. 13; see infra Part III.B.6. 
 12. APQA, supra note 9, art. 14; see infra Part III.B.7. 
 13. It is difficult to understand the meaning and impact of this legislation without 
knowledge of the Japanese laws and regulations concerning public accounts, including 
the basic provisions for public procurement procedures. These laws and regulations 
will be explained in Part II of this article. 
 14. Kaikeihō [Accounting Act], Law No. 35 of 1947 [hereinafter AA].  
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Budget, Auditing and Accounting (OBAA),15 and local agencies are 
regulated by the Local Autonomy Act16 and its implementing Order 
Concerning Enforcement of the Local Autonomy Act.17  However, 
these two sets of acts and orders are similar with respect to their basic 
framework for contractor selection processes. Therefore, this article 
will hereafter highlight only the main points of the legal provisions 
regulating national agencies and will mention the local agencies’ regu-
lations only when there is no equivalent for national agencies. 
A. Contractor Selection Procedures  
First, there is a set of rules concerning whether an award is to be 
made to a contractor through a competitive selection procedure, and if 
so, how competitive the process will be. This is the famous classifica-
tion distinguishing “open competitive tendering,” “designated com-
petitive tendering,” and “non-competitive (single-source) tendering.” 
Open competitive tendering is a procedure in which any qualified 
person may submit a tender. This is the general procedure provided in 
the relevant acts and orders, regardless whether national or local.18 
However, this procedure does not mean that anyone may uncondition-
ally take part in the bidding process. Laws and regulations obligate 
procuring entities to exclude from such process persons falling into 
certain categories19 and allow procuring entities to do so in certain 
cases.20 Moreover, chief executives of procuring entities may from the 
outset impose conditions of qualification for participation in particular 
bidding procedures.21
Designated competitive tendering and non-competitive tendering 
may be used only if the conditions prescribed by the relevant laws and 
 15. Yosan kessan oyobi kaikeirei [Order Concerning Budget, Auditing and Ac-
counting], Imperial Edict No. 165 of 1947 [hereinafter OBAA]. 
 16. Chiho Jichihō [Local Autonomy Act], Law No. 67 of 1947. 
 17. Chiho jichihō Sekōrei [Order Concerning Enforcement of the Local Autonomy 
Act], Cabinet Order No. 16 of 1947. 
 18. AA, supra note 14, art. 29(3). 
 19. See, e.g., id. art. 29(3)(2); OBAA, supra note 15, art. 70 (providing, inter alia, 
for the exclusion of a person who is incompetent to contract and a bankrupt without 
any possibility of reinstatement). 
 20. See, e.g., AA, supra note 14, art. 29(3)(2); OBAA, supra note 15, art. 71 
(providing, inter alia, that procuring entities may bar persons who are found to have 
violated the Anti-Monopoly Act from competitive bidding for a maximum period of 
two years). 
 21. OBAA, supra note 15, art. 72(1). These rules apply to designated competitive 
tendering. Id. art. 95. Open competitive tendering with these restrictions is called 
“conditional open competitive tendering.”  
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regulations are met. Designated competitive tendering is a procedure in 
which only persons invited (i.e., designated) by the procuring entities 
may submit a tender.22 Designated competitive tendering may be used 
only in the following cases: (1) when, due to the nature or purpose of 
the contract, only a small number of operators are expected to partici-
pate in competitive bidding and the use of open competitive tendering 
is not necessary; (2) when, due to the nature or purpose of the contract, 
the use of open competitive tendering is deemed to be disadvanta-
geous; 23  (3) when the estimated contract price is lower than the 
threshold level; or (4) in other cases where the order so provides.24
Non-competitive tendering is a procedure other than the two com-
petitive tendering procedures previously described. Typically, procur-
ing entities using this procedure contact targeted operators individu-
ally, negotiate with them to calculate the estimated expenses to be 
submitted to the agency, and enter into a contract. 
Non-competitive tendering may be used only in the following cases: 
(1) when the nature or purpose of the contract prohibits competition;25 
(2) when it is not possible to use a competitive selection method be-
cause of extreme urgency;26 (3) when the use of competitive tendering 
is deemed to be disadvantageous;27 (4) when the estimated contract 
price is lower than the threshold level;28 or (5) in other cases where the 
order so provides.29
Further, the relevant laws and regulations require procuring entities 
to select contractors as competitively as possible even in cases where 
the entities use designated competitive tendering or non-competitive 
tendering. That is, in designated competitive tendering cases, procuring 
 22. See id. art. 94. 
 23. AA, supra note 14, art. 29(3)(3) (providing for (1) and (2) above). An example 
of a case where the use of open competitive tendering is deemed to be disadvantageous 
is one where a “breach of contract will cause significant trouble to a government 
project.” OBAA, supra note 15, art. 104-4. 
 24. AA, supra note 14, art. 29(3)(5) (providing for (3) and (4) above). Article 94(1) 
of the OBAA specifies threshold levels for each procured object. OBAA, supra note 
15, art. 94(1). 
 25. AA, supra note 14, art. 29(3)(4). 
 26. Id. 
 27. Id. An example of a case where “the use of competition is deemed to be dis-
advantageous” is one where “if an agency did not contract urgently, it would probably 
lose the chance to contract or it would be forced to contract at a significantly disad-
vantageous price.” OBAA, supra note 15, art. 104-4. 
 28. AA, supra note 14, art. 29(3)(4).  
 29. Id. art. 29(3)(5). Article 99 of the OBAA prescribes the cases where this pro-
cedure can be used, e.g., “the case where the government activity at issue needs to be 
kept secret.” OBAA, supra note 15, art. 99. 
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entities should designate at least ten operators if possible,30 and in 
non-competitive tendering cases, procuring entities should collect 
written estimates from at least two operators if possible.31  
B. The “Price-Only Competition” Method and the “Comprehensive 
Evaluation” Method 
The issue of which type of contractor selection procedure a procur-
ing entity should use, discussed in the previous section, can be said to 
be an issue concerning whether the selection process is “competitive” 
or not and how competitive it is, whereas the distinction between the 
price-only competition method and the comprehensive evaluation 
method relates to what candidates compete over, that is, the “factors of 
competition.” First, the price-only competition method can generally 
be described as a method in which the bidder offering the lowest price 
will receive the award.32 Under the law, this method should be used in 
principle if a procuring entity uses a competitive tendering procedure, 
regardless whether it is “open” or “designated.”33 In contrast, the 
comprehensive evaluation method can be described roughly as a 
method where not only price but also other conditions such as quality, 
techniques, or skills are to be considered in the aggregate and the most 
advantageous candidate will be awarded the contract when a procuring 
entity selects a contractor. Under the law, this method should be used 
exceptionally, that is, only when certain conditions are met.34
As will be mentioned later, the latter method is not considered ex-
ceptional in the U.S. or the E.U., whereas it is so considered in Japan. 
This exceptional treatment is emphatically reflected by the provision 
stating that “[m]inisters or chiefs of departments or agencies should 
consult with the Minister of the Department of Finance” when they 
wish to use this method.35
 30. Id. art. 97(1). 
 31. Id. art. 99(6). 
 32. See AA, supra note 14, art. 29(6)(1). 
 33. Id. 
 34. Id. art. 29(6)(2). 
 35. OBAA, supra note 15, art. 91(2). This “consultation” requirement was origi-
nally interpreted as requiring individual consultation for each procurement item, so the 
comprehensive evaluation method was seldom used. Later, the competent ministries 
and the Minister of the Department of Finance agreed that this requirement should be 
interpreted as not demanding individual consultation as long as there was a compre-
hensive agreement through comprehensive consultation and they applied this revised 
interpretation to public works. Thereafter, the “Guidelines for the Comprehensive 
Evaluation Method in Public Works” were released in 2000. Now, as long as the case 
falls within the purview of these guidelines, there is no need for consultation. This fact 
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C. Maximum Estimated Price 
A specific characteristic of Japan’s scheme for selection of public 
works contractors in comparison with other countries is the existence 
of an upper-limit “estimated price” over which a bid is deemed invalid 
and a government procuring entity may not contract. This is very strict 
and there is no exception.36 This limitation is commonly applied re-
gardless of the type of contractor selection procedure.37
Under the law, a procuring entity shall estimate the bidding price or 
the contract price of the item at issue in accordance with its design and 
other specifications and other relevant characteristics,38 and the esti-
mated price shall be properly calculated through consideration of such 
relevant factors as actual market prices, the situation of supply and 
demand, the ease or difficulty of execution, the quantity, and the length 
of time necessary for execution.39 This estimated price is generally 
characterized as “just an estimated cost calculated in advance.” This 
characterization in itself is not the basis for the maximum nature of the 
estimated price. It could be based largely on the government’s own 
ideas regarding the governmental budget and disbursement. 
While the maximum estimated price eliminates prices that are too 
high, there are also schemes that forestall prices that are too low. The 
law allows a procuring entity to exclude a candidate whose bidding 
price is deemed to be so low that the contract might not be executed 
properly or that the contract would be considered improper because it 
is likely to disturb the order of fair trade.40 In such a case, a procuring 
is indeed one of the reasons for the recent increase in the number of cases using the 
comprehensive evaluation method. The exceptional nature of this method is further 
illustrated by Article 167-10-2(4) of the Order Concerning Enforcement of the Local 
Autonomy Act that provides that “procuring agencies shall consult with well-informed 
persons in advance” when the comprehensive evaluation method is used. Order Con-
cerning Enforcement of the Local Autonomy Act, supra note 17, art. 167-10-2(4). 
About all of the above, see Shigeki Kusunoki, Nyusatsudango ni taisuru shobatsu ni 
yoru kaiketsu to soreigaino kaiketsu [How Effective Are the Sanctions Under the 
Japanese Legislation and Regulations Governing Public Procurement to Address the 
Problem of Bid Rigging?], 40 SANDAI HOGAKU 1, 16 (2006) (Japan). 
 36. In the case of an auction, a minimum price limit will be set. AA, supra note 14, 
art. 29-6(1). As this issue is outside the scope of this article, a precise explanation is 
omitted. 
 37. Id. art. 26(6) (prescribing the estimated price for open competitive tendering 
and designated competitive tendering); OBAA, supra note 15, art. 99-5 (prescribing 
the estimated price for non-competitive tendering). 
 38. OBAA, supra note 15, art. 79. 
 39. Id. art. 80(2). 
 40. AA, supra note 14, art. 29(6)(1). 
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entity has an obligation to investigate the relevant facts.41 Moreover, as 
far as local governments are concerned, a minimum price limitation 
may be set.42
D. Secondary Policies 
The Act on Ensuring the Receipt of Orders from the Government and 
Other Public Agencies by Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises”43 
(Public Agency Order Act or PAOA) was enacted in 1966 to imple-
ment the aims of the Basic Act Concerning Small and Medium-Sized 
Enterprises.44 As the full name of the Act itself reflects, the Public 
Agency Order Act aims to enhance development of small and me-
dium-sized enterprises by ensuring procurement by public agencies 
from them through measures to expand opportunities for such enter-
prises to receive orders.45 This Act, composed of only seven articles, 
has long influenced Japanese public procurement practices. 
The Public Agency Order Act provides that the government and 
other public agencies “shall make efforts to expand opportunities for 
the receipt of orders by small and medium-sized enterprises, while 
giving due consideration to the proper execution of the budget” when 
public contracts are concluded.46 The Act further provides that, as 
means to carry out these obligations, each year (1) the Minister of 
Economy, Trade and Industry shall, through consultation with the 
ministers and heads of other competent ministries and agencies, draft 
guidelines to expand opportunities for small and medium-sized enter-
prises to receive orders, taking into consideration the budget and pro-
ject plans for the year;47 (2) the Minister of Economy, Trade and In-
dustry shall request approval by the Cabinet of the guidelines;48 (3) the 
heads of each of the relevant ministries and agencies shall report their 
 41. OBAA, supra note 15, art. 86(1). 
 42. Order Concerning Enforcement of the Local Autonomy Act, supra note 17, art. 
167-10(2).  
 43. Kankōju ni tsuiteno chūshō kigyōsha no juchū no kakuho ni kansuru hōritsu 
[Act on Ensuring the Receipt of Orders from the Government and Other Public Agen-
cies by Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises], Law No. 97 of 1966 [hereinafter Public 
Agency Order Act (PAOA)]. 
 44. Chūshō kigyō kihonhō [Basic Act Concerning Small and Medium-Sized En-
terprises], Law No. 154 of 1963, art. 20 (providing that the government shall take 
necessary measures to ensure proper trade by small and medium-sized enterprises). 
 45. PAOA, supra note 43, art. 1. 
 46. Id. art. 3. Article 2 of this Act defines “small and medium enterprises.” Id. art. 
2. 
 47. Id. art. 4(1)–(2). 
 48. Id. art. 4(2). 
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achievements of contracts with small and medium-sized enterprises to 
the Minister of Economy, Trade and Industry after the end of the fiscal 
or business year;49 and (4) local self-governing bodies, applying na-
tional policies, shall endeavor to take actions to ensure opportunities 
for the receipt of orders by small and medium-sized enterprises.50
In practice, government procuring entities have tried either to en-
hance small and medium-sized enterprises’ entrance into the public 
procurement market by dividing works into smaller categories or di-
viding orders into smaller lots in order to make the contract price low 
enough, 51  or to expand the receipt of orders by small and me-
dium-sized enterprises through the use of designated competitive ten-
dering or non-competitive tendering.52 In national procurement, small 
and medium-sized enterprises have received roughly forty to fifty per-
cent of the total amount of governmental contracts during the past 
decade.53
E. Practices to Adjust Opportunities Through “Designation:” Advan-
tages and Disadvantages 
The Japanese Act Concerning Prohibition of Private Monopolization 
and Maintenance of Fair Trade54 (Anti-Monopoly Act)—the equiva-
lent of antitrust law in the United States or competition law in the 
European Union—was not actively enforced for a long time between 
its enactment in 1947 and the end of the 1980s. Many regulations lim-
ited newcomers’ entry into many business fields such as transportation, 
electricity, and the media. This demonstrates that competition was not 
a basis of Japanese economic management.55
 49. Id. art. 5. 
 50. Id. art. 7. 
 51. See, e.g., Jichitai ha kansei dango no ne wo tachikire [Local Governments 
Must Root Out Bid-Rigging with the Involvement of Government Officials], NIHON 
KEIZAI SHIMBUN, Dec. 3, 2006 (Morning Ed.), at 2.  
 52. See id. 
 53. Statistics are available at the Web site of the Small and Medium Enterprise 
Agency, http://www.chusho.meti.go.jp/koukai/shingikai/download/kankoju_matome 
_sankou.pdf (last visited Apr. 12, 2007). 
 54. Shiteki dokusen no kinshi oyobi kosei torihiki no kakuho ni kansuru hōritsu 
[Japanese Act Concerning Prohibition of Private Monopolization and Maintenance of 
Fair Trade], Law No. 54 of 1947. 
 55. Some commentators point out that Japanese tend to prefer “cooperation” rather 
than “competition” based on their cultural background. See, e.g., THE JAPANESE MIND: 
UNDERSTANDING CONTEMPORARY JAPANESE CULTURE 195–97 (Roger J. Davies & 
Osamu Ikeno eds., 2002); YOSHIO SUGIMOTO, AN INTRODUCTION TO JAPANESE 
SOCIETY (CONTEMPORARY JAPANESE SOCIETY) (2d ed. 2003). 
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Japanese public procurement was not managed competitively either. 
As already stated in Section A of this Part, open competitive tendering 
is now adopted as a general rule. Until a decade ago, however, the ma-
jority of contractor selection procedures used designated competitive 
tendering.56 Generally speaking, three reasons can be cited for this. 
First, it is advantageous if procuring entities can exclude improper 
candidates from contractor selection procedures through their designa-
tion.57 Second, designated competitive tendering is an effective way to 
implement the Public Agency Order Act.58 Third, there are paternalis-
tic demands on the government to adopt designated competitive ten-
dering to assure long-term stable profits for a limited number of com-
panies which are expected to supply high-quality items or works.59
As to the third reason, assurance of companies’ long-term stable 
profits can be achieved not only through the use of designated com-
petitive tendering, but also through a system of adjustment or distribu-
tion of profits, that is, bid rigging. The adoption of designated com-
petitive tendering encourages candidates to engage in bid rigging be-
cause the number of candidates is limited through the designation, the 
list of designated candidates can frequently be fixed, and candidates 
can collude more easily.60 Moreover, in many cases, procuring entities 
tacitly permit and sometimes actively get involved in bid rigging.61 
Many commentators informally contend that competition is restrained 
by bid rigging in most procurement cases in Japan.62 Naturally, this 
anti-competitive characteristic of public procurement has supported a 
cozy relationship among politicians, bureaucrats, and businesspersons 
for a long time.63
 56. See, e.g., WTO Secretariat, Japan: Policy Developments Affecting Trade and 
Investment, WT/TPR/S/32 (Jan. 5, 1998) (stating that selective tendering had been a 
“previously pervasive” procedure), available at 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/gproc_e/japan.pdf. 
 57. See, e.g., Yasushi Ohno, Kokyokōji ni okeru nyusatsu keiyaku hoshiki nokadai 
[Reconsidering Bidding and Contracting Methods of Public Works], 27 KAIKEI KENSA 
KENKYU 159, 162. 
 58. See, e.g., Kusunoki, supra note 35, at 17. 
 59. See Ohno, supra note 57, at 161; Kusunoki, supra note 35, at 14–15. This idea 
is very controversial. Some commentators may insist that the more intense the com-
petition, the higher the quality of the items and works the successful candidates will 
supply. 
 60. See, e.g., BRIAN WOODALL, JAPAN UNDER CONSTRUCTION: CORRUPTION, 
POLITICS, AND PUBLIC WORKS 38 (1996). 
 61. Id. at 39–41.  
 62. Id. at 27. 
 63. Id. at 39–41. 
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Criticisms of this problem have grown louder since a number of in-
famous bid-rigging and bribery cases, including one involving then 
Construction Minister Kishiro Nakamura and Kajima Corporation, the 
largest construction company in Japan, triggered the public’s anger in 
the 1990s.64 Designated competitive tendering then became a target of 
criticism as a hotbed of unjust activities.65 Almost simultaneously, the 
sanction regime and the enforcement of the Anti-Monopoly Act were 
strengthened.66 Furthermore, most national and some local administra-
tive agencies started to treat open competitive tendering as the general 
rule for procurement to implement the WTO-GPA after it came into 
force in 1996.67
The price-only competition method was, however, left as the general 
rule.68 Public works is one of the fields most disadvantaged by this. 
Coupled with the long-term recession and the drastic curtailment of the 
public project budgets throughout the 1990s,69 the change to open 
competitive bidding forced civil engineering and construction compa-
nies to compete much harder than before and this increased competi-
tion led to dumping. As a result, there have been many cases where the 
contract price was much lower than the estimated price that had been 
deemed to be reasonable.70
 64. A. Didrick Castberg, Prosecutorial Independence in Japan, 16 UCLA PAC. 
BASIN L.J. 38, 83–84 (1997). Nakamura was alleged to have received a bribe of ten 
million yen from Kiyoyama Shinji, a vice president of Kajima, in exchange “for 
Nakamura’s convincing the [Japanese] Fair Trade Commission [JFTC] not to pursue 
collusion charges against a cartel of construction firms in Saitama prefecture.” Id. at 
83; see also WOODALL, supra note 60, at 126. 
 65. Kokyokōji hōritsu mamori tomei ni [Compliance and Transparency in Public 
Projects], NIHON KEIZAI SHIMBUN, Jul. 16, 2000 (Morning Ed.), at 18. 
 66. See, e.g., Shigeki Kusunoki, Shaping an Anti-Monopoly Law Sanction Regime 
Against Cartels or Bid Collusion: A Perspective on Japan’s Choice, 79 U. DET. 
MERCY L. REV. 399 (2002). 
 67. Until the end of the last century, however, the speed of the reforms was slow. 
 68. There has not been any change to AA article 29(6)(1) which provides that the 
price-only competition method is a general rule. AA, supra note 14, art. 29(6)(1).  
 69. The Junichiro Koizumi administration (2001–06) has been based on the con-
cept of “a small government.” This concept has been the engine to budget curtailment. 
See, e.g., Haruki Sasamori, Shift to Small Govt Accelerates, YOMIURI SHIMBUN, Dec. 
28, 2005, at 4. 
 70. In January 2007, the Fair Trade Commission started an investigation and an 
analysis of the situation concerning unreasonably low bidding. See Koutori teikakaku 
nyusatsu de sujyussha chosa [The FTC Investigates Dozens of Enterprises for Unrea-
sonable Low Bidding], NIHON KEIZAI SHIMBUN, Jan. 5, 2007 (Evening Ed.), at 18. 
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III. NEW LEGISLATION ON PUBLIC WORKS: THE ACT FOR PROMOTING 
QUALITY ASSURANCE IN PUBLIC WORKS (APQA) 
A. Background of the Legislation71
In response to the cries of construction companies in the wake of in-
tense competition, the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), the ruling 
party for a long time after WWII, started to move to address their 
hardships.72 In June 2003, the LDP launched an internal survey and a 
study group on the issue. 
In the same month, the Japanese Fair Trade Commission (JFTC) 
launched “The Study Group Concerning Public Procurement and 
Competition Policy,” which aimed to suggest new schemes and prac-
tices to deter bid rigging and maximize “value for money.”73 The 
recommendations of the study group’s report published in November 
2003 include “the positive active use of the comprehensive evaluation 
method” and “the introduction of the competitive dialogue method,”74 
both later incorporated into the provisions of the APQA. 
The JFTC’s report published simultaneously suggested that amend-
ment of the Anti-Monopoly Act was needed to strengthen the sanctions 
against various types of misconduct.75 This added fuel to the LDP 
members’ sense of an impending crisis because they thought the 
stricter sanctions would lead to an increase in dumping by construction 
 71. Information about the background and legislative history of the APQA can 
generally be found only in specialized newspapers written in Japanese. 
 72. The construction industry is one of the LDP’s important money pipelines and 
one of its power bases. See WOODALL, supra note 60, ch. 3. 
 73. For a discussion of the basic concept and understanding of “value for money,” 
see U.K. NAT’L AUDIT OFFICE (NAO) & OFFICE OF GOV’T COMMERCE (OGC), GETTING 
VALUE FOR MONEY FROM PROCUREMENT: HOW AUDITORS CAN HELP, available at, 
http://www.ogc.gov.uk/documents/Value_for_Money_(VFM)_in_Procurement_-_Th
e_Role_of_Auditors.pdf. This report explains that value for money “is defined as the 
optimum combination of whole life costs and quality.” Id. at 3. Guidelines for im-
plementation of the value for money policy in the United Kingdom are set out in HER 
MAJESTY’S TREASURY, GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTING 2000, ch. 22 (as amended) (U.K.), 
available at http://www.government-accounting.gov.uk/current/frames.htm (click 
“Contents”; then scroll down left side of page for link to ch. 22). 
 74. JAPAN FAIR TRADE COMM’N, REPORT FROM THE WORKSHOP REGARDING PUBLIC 
PROCUREMENT AND COMPETITION POLICY, available at 
http://www.jftc.go.jp/pressrelease/03.november/03111801.pdf. 
 75. JAPAN FAIR TRADE COMM’N, REPORT OF THE STUDY GROUP ON THE 
ANTIMONOPOLY ACT, PART 1: COMPREHENSIVE REVIEW OF ENFORCEMENT SYSTEMS 
(Oct. 28, 2003), available at http://www.jftc.go.jp/e-page/reports/survey/2003/1.pdf; 
http://www.jftc.go.jp/e-page/reports/survey/2003/2.pdf; http://www.jftc.go.jp/e-page/ 
reports/survey/2003/3.pdf (English “tentative” translations of Nov. 21, 2003). 
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companies. The LDP therefore rushed to enact new legislation on pub-
lic works. 
In autumn 2004, Diet76  members introduced a bill to enact the 
APQA at the same time the Cabinet submitted a bill to amend the 
Anti-Monopoly Act. The former was enacted three weeks after the lat-
ter in spring 2005.77
B. Introduction to the Contents of the APQA 
1. Purpose 
Article 1 of the APQA states that its purpose is to “set[] forth a basic 
philosophy for ensuring the quality of public works in order to clarify 
the responsibilities of the central government and other stakeholders” 
and “basic policies to promote quality in public works in order to im-
prove the public welfare and contribute to the sound development of 
the national economy.”78
2. Definition of “Public Works” 
Article 2 provides that the “public works” that are covered by the 
APQA are “as defined in Article 2.2 of the Act for Promoting Proper 
Tendering and Contracting for Public Works.”79
3. Basic Philosophy 
Article 3 of the APQA describes the basic philosophy of the Act as 
follows: 
1. In that public works, providing social capital that supports the 
well-being and economic activities of the public, have important 
socioeconomic implications, the central and local governments, as 
well as other entities that place and receive orders for public works, 
 76. “The Diet” in Japan, which is composed of the House of Representatives and 
the House of Councilors, is equivalent to the Parliament in the United Kingdom.  
 77. Law No. 35, 2005. The APQA came into force on April 1, only one day after 
the bill was passed. APQA, supra note 9, art. 1, appx. 
 78. Id. art. 1, translated in Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and Transp., Bill for 
Ensuring the Quality of Public Works, 
http://www.hrr.mlit.go.jp/gijyutu/hinkaku/html/hou-english.html (last visited Apr. 10, 
2007). All subsequent citations to the APQA are to this English translation. 
 79. Id. art. 2; see Kokyokōji no nyusatsu oyobi keiyaku no tekiseika no sokushin ni 
kansuru hōritsu [Act for Promoting Proper Tendering and Contracting for Public 
Works], Law No. 127 of 2000, art. 2(2) (“[I]n this Act, ‘public works’ means con-
struction works ordered by the central government, the semi-governmental special 
corporations and the local governments.”). 
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should ensure the quality of public works for present and future 
generations of the Japanese people in fulfilling their respective roles. 
2. In that construction work has such unique characteristics as that its 
quality can be confirmed only after structures are provided for use, its 
quality depends to a great degree upon the technological capabilities 
of contractors, and its conditions differ significantly between indi-
vidual projects, various factors in addition to price should be con-
sidered to ensure the quality of public works; due consideration 
should also be given to economic efficiency, resulting in the con-
clusion of contracts that comprehensively consider pricing and 
quality. 
3. In that work efficiency, safety, environmental impact and other 
factors are important considerations in ensuring the quality of public 
works, quality assurance should employ the most appropriate tech-
nologies available. 
4. To ensure the quality of public works, due attention should be 
given to ensuring the transparency of tendering and contracting 
processes and the content of contracts, the fairness of competition for 
contracts, the removal of construction companies that are not quali-
fied as contractors, the elimination of improper activities such as 
collusion and bid-rigging, and the use of proper construction prac-
tices. 
5. To ensure the quality of public works, due consideration should be 
given to the private companies employed in public works projects, 
including the proper evaluation of their capabilities; the proper re-
flection of these capabilities in tendering and contracting; and the use 
of their technical proposals (herein meaning proposals on technology 
utilization submitted for public works contracts to be awarded 
competitively), originality, and ingenuity. 
6. To ensure the quality of public works, due attention should be 
given to the conclusion of fair contracts based on agreements be-
tween parties negotiating on an equal footing, and to the good-faith 
implementation of these contracts. 
7. To ensure the quality of public works, the quality of surveys on and 
designs for public works shall be ensured in accordance with the 
principles set forth in the preceding paragraphs, in that the quality of 
such surveys and designs significantly affect the quality of public 
works.80
 80. APQA, supra note 9, art. 3.  
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4. Responsibilities 
Articles 4, 5, 6, and 7 of the APQA provide for the responsibilities of 
the national and local governments, procuring entities, and contractors. 
Article 4 provides that the national government “shall assume respon-
sibility for formulating and implementing comprehensive measures to 
ensure the quality of public works.”81 Article 5 commands the local 
governments to assume the same responsibility “in cooperation with 
the central government, while giving due consideration to local 
needs.”82 Article 6 provides that the procuring entities “shall properly 
perform . . . the production of written specifications, evaluation of 
prices, determination of tendering and contracting methods, selection 
of the contractor, supervision and inspection of work, and confirmation 
and evaluation of the progress of construction during the work period 
and at the time of completion.”83 Finally, Article 7 requires public 
works contractors to perform their work “pursuant to the basic phi-
losophy, and shall improve their technological capabilities to that 
end.”84
5. Basic Principles 
Articles 8, 9, and 10 provide for basic principles and responsibilities 
pursuant thereto to be established by the national government. Article 
8 directs the national government to set forth, and then give public no-
tice of, “basic principles for the comprehensive implementation of 
measures to ensure the quality of public works,” giving “consideration 
to the autonomy of quasi-governmental agencies . . . and of local gov-
ernments.”85 Article 9 prescribes the obligation of the heads of minis-
tries and agencies, heads and representatives of quasi-governmental 
and independent administrative agencies, and local government heads 
to “implement necessary measures to promote the quality of public 
works in accordance with basic principles.”86 Finally, Article 10 pro-
vides that the national government “shall establish systematic coopera-
tion between concerned administrative organizations” in formulating 
and implementing the basic principles.87
 81. Id. art. 4. 
 82. Id. art. 5. 
 83. Id. art. 6. 
 84. Id. art. 7. 
 85. APQA, supra note 9, art. 8. 
 86. Id. art. 9. 
 87. Id. art. 10. 
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6. Evaluation of the Technical Capabilities of Bidding Participants and 
Technical Proposals 
Articles 11 through 13 are provisions concerning the evaluation of 
the technical capabilities of and technical proposals from the partici-
pants in competitive bidding for public works contracts. First, Article 
11 requires procuring entities to review the capabilities of candidates, 
“including their experience in constructing public works, their past 
construction experience and the expertise of the[ir] engineers.”88 Next, 
Article 12 requires procuring entities generally to request that candi-
dates submit technical proposals, and in cases where technical propos-
als are requested, the entities “shall give public notice of both the re-
quest and the method of evaluating proposals in advance;” “shall 
properly examine and evaluate” the proposals, “implement[ing] meas-
ures to ensure . . . neutrality and fairness,” including complaint resolu-
tion measures; and generally “shall subsequently make public the re-
sults of their evaluations.”89 Finally, Article 13 prescribes the dialogue 
method for improvement of technical proposals. Specifically, it states 
that a procuring entity may request contractors to improve submitted 
proposals or give them the opportunity to do so, and, in such a case, 
the procuring entity shall “provide an overview of the technical pro-
posal improvement process.”90 This latter provision is meant to keep 
the process of technical proposal improvement transparent. 
7. Ex Post Facto Determination of a Maximum Estimated Price 
Article 14 of the APQA provides for the ex post facto determination 
of a maximum estimated price following evaluation of technical pro-
posals. Specifically, in a case where a procuring entity “request[s] 
technical proposals that involve advanced technologies,” it may set a 
cap on the estimated price “based on the results of its evaluations of 
proposals.” 91  Moreover, “[i]n examining technical proposals,” the 
procuring entity is obligated to “seek the opinions of knowledgeable 
persons who can offer fair judgments from a neutral position.”92
8. Assistance from Other People and Organizations 
Procuring entities need sufficient administrative skills and experi-
ence to handle bidding procedures in order to carry out public works 
 88. Id. art. 11. 
 89. Id. art. 12. 
 90. Id. art. 13. 
 91. Id. art. 14. 
 92. APQA, supra note 9, art. 14. 
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properly. In cases where the contents of works are highly specialized 
and complicated techniques are needed, however, many procuring en-
tities, especially those of local governments, do not have sufficient 
skills. Article 15 of the APQA therefore provides that the procuring 
entities are obligated to entrust performance of their duties to other 
people or organizations that have sufficient skills and experience.93
C. Significance and Impact of the New Act 
  1. Comprehensive Evaluation Not to Be an Exception in Public 
Works 
Under the APQA, the comprehensive evaluation method will be used 
more often than before, in place of the price-only competition method, 
which has been used on a regular basis. As the quotation of Article 
3(2) above indicates, this provision of the Act provides that various 
factors in addition to price should be considered to ensure the quality 
of public works.94
It is said that the LDP inserted the vague expression “various factors 
in addition to price” into this article because it wanted to weaken 
pressure from the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ), the largest opposi-
tion party, in order to speed up passage of the legislation. The domi-
nant opinion of the members of the DPJ—a party which depends heav-
ily on the support of local and small-sized enterprises—was that “qual-
ity” should be defined to include various factors such as contributions 
to local events, contributions to charities, and contributions to disaster 
measures.95 These are all activities that local and small-sized enter-
prises actively pursue in their home areas. As a result, it is uncertain 
exactly how comprehensive the comprehensive evaluation method will 
actually turn out to be in practice. 
2. Dialogue Method 
Article 13 of the APQA, which, as explained above, provides for a 
method of dialogue between a candidate and a procuring entity to im-
prove a submitted technical proposal, can be said to be the core of the 
Act. Under the Accounting Act, the Local Autonomy Act, and related 
 93. Id. art. 15(1)–(3). 
 94. Id. art. 3(2). 
 95. There are many criticisms of this vagueness. See, e.g., Tarou Sawaki, Hinka-
kuho eno aru huan [Uneasiness About the Act for Promoting Quality Assurance in 
Public Works], 54 (4) CE (CIVIL ENGINEERING) 33 (2005) (explaining the main text’s 
story between the LDP and the DPJ). 
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orders, the holding of a dialogue between the time of notice and that of 
bidding are neither permitted nor prohibited in competitive tendering 
procedures.96 Article 13, however, encourages and can be used as jus-
tification for the use of the dialogue method by clearly describing the 
process for dialogue between a candidate and a procuring entity to im-
prove a submitted technical proposal prior to the bidding date. 
One potential problem is arbitrariness on the part of procuring enti-
ties in cases where the dialogue method is used. In this regard, Article 
13 makes it obligatory for procuring entities to make public an over-
view of the process for improvement of technical proposals. The 
APQA, however, does not provide any further details. 
3. Estimated Price: Ex Post Facto Determination 
The method of determining estimated prices was drastically changed 
by Article 14, which provides that a procuring entity “may cap esti-
mates based on the results of its evaluations of proposals” in cases 
where it requests “technical proposals that involve advanced technolo-
gies.”97 In such cases, the time of determination is expected to be sev-
eral days prior to the day of bidding.98 Generally, estimated prices are 
determined at the stage of the procurement notice. As to such prices, 
the Order Concerning Budget, Auditing and Accounting requires the 
entity to estimate price “on the basis of the specifications and the de-
sign documents” and related factors concerning the item, and to “keep 
the document in which this estimated price is written or recorded at the 
time when submitted bids are opened.”99 If there is a very large infor-
mational gap concerning the technical proposals between the procuring 
entity and candidates and if the need for dialogue to improve the sub-
mitted proposals is very strong, this means that the procuring entity 
lacks sufficient data to determine the estimated price and it cannot 
make such a determination in advance. In such a situation, an ex post 
facto determination of the estimated price is inevitable. 
 96. See AA, supra note 14, art. 29(1)–(12) (ch. 4); Local Autonomy Act, supra 
note 16, ch. 9, § 6; OBAA, supra note 15, arts. 68–102 (ch. 7); Order Concerning 
Enforcement of the Local Autonomy Act, supra note 17, ch. 5, § 6. There is no provi-
sion concerning “negotiation” in the competitive bidding procedures. Indeed, a few 
procuring entities had used the dialogue method before the APQA came into force. 
 97. APQA, supra note 9, art. 14. 
 98. In one previous case, the estimated price was determined four days before the 
day of bidding. 
 99. OBAA, supra note 15, art. 79. 
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  4. Monitoring and Bid Protests 
To assure the quality of public works, it seems appropriate to adopt a 
flexible system of procurement methods. The greater the number of 
various methods available, however, the more important the proce-
dures for monitoring procuring entities become. In competitive ten-
dering, where price is the sole evaluated item, there are no serious 
problems because the successful bidders are determined automatically 
based only on the prices that they submit. In competitive tendering 
where the comprehensive evaluation method is adopted—especially in 
cases where candidates submit technical proposals, they and the pro-
curing entities hold discussions, and the estimated price is determined 
ex post facto—the need for monitoring procuring entities increases and 
the techniques for undertaking such monitoring are complicated. In 
Japan, third-party institutions like the Committee for the Oversight of 
Bidding, which consists of part-time members including lawyers, 
scholars, and journalists, tend to be emphasized. 
Moreover, it is expected that the more varied and flexible the pro-
curing methods are, the greater the number of unsuccessful candidates 
who will make complaints.100 Unsuccessful candidates are supposed to 
be the most effective monitoring parties because they are the most in-
terested parties who are close to the procuring entities. Therefore, es-
tablishment of sufficient and effective bid-protest procedures is one of 
the most urgent tasks in government procurement regimes. 
Neither a monitoring scheme nor a bid-protest scheme is addressed 
in the APQA. Only the supplementary resolutions for the bill by the 
respective committees on Land and Transport in the House of Repre-
sentatives and the House of Councilors deal with these matters, pro-
viding in identical language that one of the objectives of the measures 
the government should implement to enforce the law is “[t]o properly 
reflect the opinions of third parties such as knowledgeable persons re-
garding the tendering and contracting process for public works, and to 
properly handle complaints from concerned parties, including the en-
actment of legislation where necessary.”101
To implement the WTO-GPA, in 1995 Japan established the Office 
for the Government Procurement Challenge System (CHANS) to deal 
 100. As the author mentions later, there is the marked tendency in the Japanese 
community for people to think that “a dispute is best avoided.” Therefore, the author 
has reservations concerning the effectiveness of any bid-protest scheme that is estab-
lished. 
 101. Resolution on the Bill for Quality Assurance of Public Works art. 2 (as drafted 
by the House of Councilors, Comm. on Land & Transp. (Diet), Mar. 29, 2005) (Japan), 
available at http://www.cgr.mlit.go.jp/hinkaku/qoality_050412_e.htm. 
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with bid protests involving national procuring entities. However, this 
system had seldom been used as of July 2006.102 This is probably due 
to the Japanese anti-competitive and cooperative mindset ingrained in 
the domestic construction and civil engineering industries. The exam-
ining committee in this system (the Government Procurement Review 
Board), like the Committee for the Oversight of Bidding, is a 
third-party institution consisting of part-time members.103 Moreover, 
as of the same date, few local governments had established bid-protest 
procedures.104
D. Practical Responses 
Generally speaking, as of July 2006, most government agencies had 
not yet sufficiently prepared for the enforcement of the APQA.105 In 
August 2005, the Cabinet endorsed the basic principles provided in 
Article 8 of the Act. 106  The Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and 
Transport (MLIT) then published guidelines concerning the enforce-
ment of the Act in September 2005.107 Regional branches of the MLIT, 
other national agencies, and local governments are currently consider-
ing or beginning to undertake measures to implement the Act. 
 102. Cabinet Office, Office for Gov’t Procurement Challenge Sys., Public Release 
of Status of Receipt and Review of Complaints (Japan), available at 
http://www5.cao.go.jp/access/english/chans_main_e.html (last visited Jan. 28, 2007) 
(follow “Public Release of Status of Receipt and Review of Complaints” hyperlink). 
 103. See Cabinet Office, Government Procurement Review Board Members (Ja-
pan), http://www5.cao.go.jp/access/english/chans/chans-member-e.html (last visited 
Mar. 7, 2007). 
 104. Due to time and space limitations, this article does not address the subject of 
legal review because the author believes that it would be very complicated to organize 
and examine country and regional regulations and practices for a comparative analysis 
of the United States, the European Union, and Japan. The author of course recognizes 
the importance of this matter. 
 105. See, e.g., Interview by Kensetsu Kogyo Shimbun with Masashi Waki, Member 
of the Diet (Feb. 15, 2006), available at http://www.waki-m.jp/column/column060217 
.html. 
 106. See CABINET OFFICE, GUIDELINES (2005), available at 
http://www.skr.mlit.go.jp/etc/hinkaku/pdf/7.pdf. 
 107. MINISTRY OF LAND, INFRASTRUCTURE AND TRANSP., GUIDELINES CONCERNING 
ENFORCEMENT OF THE ACT FOR PROMOTING QUALITY IN PUBLIC WORKS (2005), 
available at http://www.mlit.go.jp/tec/nyuusatu/keiyaku/170930/01.pdf.  
2007] GOVERNMENT PROCUREMENT 543 
                                                                                                               
IV. JAPAN VIS-À-VIS THE UNITED STATES, THE EUROPEAN UNION, 
AND THE WTO-GPA 
This Part analyzes the Japanese laws in comparison with the corre-
sponding U.S. 108  and E.U. laws 109  (in part E.U. member states’ 
laws)110 and points out the hurdles that Japan must overcome to im-
plement the WTO-GPA fully. 
A. Comparison with the United States and the European Union 
1. Contractor Award Process 
With regard to the contractor award process, a notable characteristic 
of the relevant Japanese laws is that the comprehensive evaluation 
 108. The U.S. federal procurement regimes consist of the Armed Services Pro-
curement Act, 10 U.S.C. §§ 2202, 2301–14, 2381, 2383 (2006), and the Federal 
Property and Administrative Services Act of 1949, Pub. L. No. 81-152, 63 Stat. 377 
(codified as amended at 41 U.S.C. §§ 251–53d, 253f–54, 254b–66a (2006) and scat-
tered sections of other titles, especially 40 U.S.C.), which generally regulate pro-
curement processes; the Buy American Act, 47 Stat. 1520 (codified as amended at 41 
U.S.C. §§ 10a–10d and scattered sections of other titles), which obligates procuring 
agencies to purchase U.S. domestic products; the Contract Disputes Act of 1978, Pub. 
L. No. 95-563, 92 Stat. 2383 (codified as amended at 41 U.S.C. §§ 601–13, 5 U.S.C. § 
5108, and scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.), which provides procedures for resolution of 
disputes; and the Competition in Contracting Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369, Div. B, 
Title VII, 98 Stat. 1175 (codified as amended at 31 U.S.C. §§ 3551–56, 41 U.S.C. §§ 
253a–53b (2006), and in scattered sections of other titles) which aims at assuring 
competitiveness in public contracts. Pursuant to these acts, the General Services 
Agency, the Department of Defense, and the National Aeronautics and Space Ad-
ministration (NASA) jointly established the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR), 48 
C.F.R. pts. 1–53 (2006), which broadly regulates the whole of the federal procurement 
processes including bid protests (FAR part 33). See W. NOEL KEYES, GOVERNMENT 
CONTRACTS IN A NUTSHELL chs. 1, 33 (4th ed. 2004). 
 109. Public procurement in the member states of the European Union is regulated by 
the member states’ respective laws and regulations. These must be consistent with any 
E.U. directive adopted and promulgated by the Council of the European Union. See 
Treaty Establishing the European Community (Nice consolidated version), Dec. 24, 
2002, 2002 O.J. (C 325) 33, art. 249. The currently valid directive concerning the 
award of public works, supply, and service contracts, which applies to the awarding of 
contracts equal to or greater than a certain amount, is European Parliament and 
Council Directive 2004/18/EC, 2004 O.J. (L 134) 114. See European Commission, 
Public Procurement Legislation: New Directives (Legislative Package), 
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/publicprocurement/legislation_en.htm#current 
(last visited Mar. 7, 2007). See generally CHRISTOPHER BOVIS, PUBLIC PROCUREMENT 
IN THE EUROPEAN UNION (2005). 
 110. For a comparative analysis of the U.S. and E.U. regimes, see Jean-Jacques 
Verdeaux, Public Procurement in the European Union and in the United States: A 
Comparative Study, 32 PUB. CONT. L. J. 713 (2003). 
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method has not been adopted as the general rule for either national or 
local government procurement.111 Prior to the enactment of the APQA, 
this was true even for items where sophisticated techniques were 
needed in public works, such as in airport or dam construction. Pro-
curing entities have generally dealt with problems concerning quality 
or techniques not by adoption of the comprehensive evaluation method 
but instead by use of designated competitive tendering.112 Though the 
law provides that designated competitive tendering may be adopted 
exceptionally, in practice the reverse has continued for a long time.113 
As previously pointed out, one basis for the APQA’s enactment was the 
increasing difficulty in excluding incompetent contractors from public 
procurements through “designation” because designated competitive 
tendering was considered to be a vice as a result of the aforementioned 
Nakamura and other bid-rigging and bribery scandals that broke out in 
the 1990s. 114  Therefore, procuring entities became obligated to use 
open competitive tendering as the rule and this has led to cut-throat 
competition among candidates.115
As a result of the enactment of the APQA, the basic contractor award 
procedure for public works in Japan changed from the combination of 
“designated competitive tendering with a price-only evaluation 
method” to “open competitive tendering with a comprehensive evalua-
tion method.” As will be shown, this change has brought Japanese law 
more in line with U.S. law and practice. It must be remembered, how-
ever, that this change in Japanese procedure currently affects only pub-
lic works, due to the limited applicability of the APQA. 
Unlike in Japan, neither U.S. nor E.U. law differentiate between the 
procedure for government procurement of public works and that for 
other types of items or works. In the United States, the generally used 
“full and open competition” procedure, equivalent to the primary pro-
cedure of “open competitive tendering” in Japan, uses two types of 
evaluation methods, namely, the “sealed bidding” method,116 in which 
the contract is awarded to the bidder with the lowest price,117 and the 
 111. In the last few years, only the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and Transport 
has tried to use the comprehensive evaluation method on a regular basis. As a whole, 
however, this method is exceptionally used. 
 112. About use of designated competitive tendering in order to maintain quality of 
public works, see supra Part II.E. 
 113. See id. 
 114. See id. 
 115. See supra Part III.A. 
 116. 48 C.F.R. pt. 14 (2006). 
 117. Under sealed bidding, contracts are awarded “to that responsible bidder whose 
bid, conforming to the invitation for bids, will be most advantageous to the Govern-
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“competitive proposal” method,118 in which the candidate presenting 
the proposal “that represents the best value” is awarded the contract.119 
Sealed bidding may be used only in cases where certain conditions are 
met.120 In the European Union, on the other hand, combinations of the 
“open procedure with a price-only evaluation method,” the “restrictive 
procedure with a price-only evaluation method,” the “open procedure 
with a comprehensive evaluation method,” or the “restrictive proce-
dure with a comprehensive evaluation method” may be used on a 
case-by-case basis.121 The European Union’s “open procedure” and 
“restrictive procedure” are equivalent, respectively, to open competi-
tive tendering and designated competitive tendering in Japan. Among 
the four methods, there is no designation as to which should be used as 
a general rule and which should be used as an exception.122
Another important development in the Japanese public procurement 
regimes, discussed previously, is that the APQA permits the use of 
dialogue in both types of competitive tendering procedures.123 This 
may be understood as an approach similar to the U.S. regimes. 
Namely, under U.S. law, both the “full and open competition” and 
ment, considering only price and the price-related factors included in the invitation.” 
48 C.F.R. § 14.101(e) (2006). The price-related factors that may be applicable and 
would therefore be included in a bid solicitation are listed at 48 C.F.R. § 14.201-8 
(2006). 
 118. 48 C.F.R. §§ 6.401(b), pt. 15 (2006). 
 119.  48 C.F.R. § 15.302 (2006); see 48 C.F.R. § 15.304 (2006) (describing the 
factors and “significant subfactors” of evaluation of a proposal). 
 120. 48 C.F.R. § 6.401(a) (2006). This subpart provides: 
“Contracting officers shall solicit sealed bids” if the four following 
conditions are met: 
(1) Time permits the solicitation, submission, and evaluation of sealed bids, 
(2) The award will be made on the basis of price and other price-related 
factors, 
(3) It is not necessary to conduct discussions with the responding offerors 
about their bids, and 
(4) There is a reasonable expectation of receiving more than one sealed bid. 
Id. 
 121. In practice, the member states might treat the open procedure as a general rule 
and the restrictive procedure as an exception or vice-versa. 
 122. European Parliament and Council Directive 2004/18/EC, 2004 O.J. (L 134) 
114 arts. 28, 53. However, this does not mean the laws and regulations of all member 
states that implement the Directive distinguish between the rule and the exception(s) 
on this point. 
 123. See APQA, supra note 9, art. 13.  
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“full and open competition after exclusion of sources”124 procedures 
allow the use of the competitive proposal method in which negotia-
tion125 between the procuring entity and candidates is expected.126 In 
the European Union, neither the open procedure nor the restricted pro-
cedure inherently anticipate negotiation. Instead, the “competitive dia-
logue” method in which procuring entities negotiate with candidates in 
a competitive environment was introduced by a new directive issued in 
2004.127
To the extent that a method by which a procuring entity and a can-
didate can hold discussions as part of a competitive procedure exists in 
public procurement law, however, the United States, the European 
Union, and Japan currently concur. 
2. Maximum Estimated Price and Reasonable Price 
Among the United States, the European Union, and Japan, the con-
cept of capping the estimate for a contract price in public procurement 
exists only in Japan.128 The Japanese public procurement regimes are 
therefore special in this respect. Although in a given case in the United 
States the procuring entity calculates a price it deems reasonable in 
light of the specifications of the targeted items and unit prices of mate-
 124. It should be noted that in the United States, procuring agencies designate 
certain entities that are excluded from the award competition, not those that may 
participate in it. On the other hand, as mentioned in the text accompanying note 123, 
Japanese designated competitive bidding is similar to the restrictive procedure of the 
European Union. 
 125. “Negotiation” means “a procedure that includes the receipt of proposals from 
offerors, permits bargaining, and usually affords offerors an opportunity to revise their 
offers before award of a contract.” KEYES, supra note 108, at 269. The FAR provides 
that “[b]argaining includes persuasion, alteration of assumptions and positions, 
give-and-take, and may apply to price, schedule, technical requirements, type of 
contract, or other terms of a proposed contract.” 48 C.F.R. § 15.306(d) (2006). 
 126. See 48 C.F.R. pt. 15 (“Contracting by Negotiation”). 
 127. Article 29 of European Parliament and Council Directive 2004/18/EC provides 
the process for the competitive dialogue. European Parliament and Council Directive 
2004/18/EC, 2004 O.J. (L 134) 114 art. 29. The Directive defines “competitive dia-
logue” as:  
a procedure in which any economic operator may request to participate and 
whereby the contracting authority conducts a dialogue with the candidates 
admitted to that procedure, with the aim of developing one or more suitable 
alternatives capable of meeting its requirements, and on the basis of which 
the candidates chosen are invited to tender. 
Id. art. 1(11)(c).  
 128. See supra Part II.C. 
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rials, this price is the standard of suitability, not the upper limit.129 If 
the price offered by the most advantageous candidate exceeds this rea-
sonable price, the procuring entity then examines whether this price is 
still within the reasonable range.130
Since, as aforementioned, procuring entities may dialogue with can-
didates to enable them to improve their proposed techniques pursuant 
to the APQA, it does not make sense to set the estimated price at the 
time of the invitation notice. The Act permits the estimated price to be 
set after holding discussions,131 thereby rendering the estimated price 
extremely flexible, and procuring entities may consider many compli-
cated factors in addition to budgetary restrictions when determining a 
suitable estimated price. 
3. Secondary Policies 
Secondary policies (policies other than those based on economic 
reasonableness) are commonly considered in public procurement law 
and practice around the world. In the United States, policies of protec-
tion of small and medium-sized enterprises and creation of jobs are 
reflected in several public procurement laws which provide special 
budgets for certain projects,132 using the “full and open competition 
after exclu[sion of] . . . sources” procedure.133 For example, the Small 
Business Act 134  establishes a program that authorizes the Small 
Business Administration to enter into contracts with other agencies and 
thereafter subcontract their performance to firms eligible for program 
 129. As to the United States, see 48 C.F.R. § 15.404-1(b) (2006). European Par-
liament and Council Directive 2004/18/EC mentions neither the reasonable price nor 
the upper limit.  
 130. See 48 C.F.R. § 14.404-2(f) (2006) (“Any bid may be rejected if the contracting 
officer determines in writing that it is unreasonable as to price.”); see also 48 C.F.R. § 
14.408-2(a) (“The contracting officer shall determine . . . that the prices offered are 
reasonable before awarding the contract.”). 
 131. See APQA, supra note 9, art. 14. 
 132. 48 C.F.R. §§ 6.203–6.205 (2006). 
 133. 48 C.F.R. § 6.200 (2006). 
 134. 15 U.S.C. §§ 631–57f (2006). 
548 BROOK. J. INT’L L. [Vol. 32:2 
                                                                                                               
participation135 based on different considerations than the usual “most 
favorable offer” evaluation standard.136  
The E.U. directive does not contain any provisions concerning sec-
ondary policies; instead, the matter is left up to the member states. 
Generally speaking, member states’ national laws tend to support small 
and medium-sized enterprises and entities which usually must compete 
with large enterprises and entities at a disadvantage. In Germany, the 
Act Against Restraints of Competition (Gesetz gegen Wettbewerbs-
beschränkungen)137 provides that “[t]he interests of small and me-
dium-sized undertakings shall primarily be taken into account in an 
appropriate manner by subdividing contracts into trade-specific and 
partial lots.”138 In France, the Code of Public Contracts (Le Code des 
Marchés Publics) provides that “[i]n the event of identical prices or 
equivalent bids for a contract, a preferential right is granted to bids 
submitted by a workers’ production cooperative, an agricultural pro-
ducers’ group, a craftsman, a craftsmen’s cooperative society or an 
artists’ cooperative society or an adapted company.”139 It appears to 
the author that concerns for secondary policies are not involved in the 
“most economically advantageous” evaluation standard.140
 In applying the guidelines drafted pursuant to the Public Agency 
Order Act, government procuring entities in Japan, as in the European 
Union, tend to carry out secondary policies through specially designed 
entity-specific programs. In addition, certain projects are designated 
for award to small and medium-sized enterprises only. This system is 
abstractly similar to the aforementioned U.S. “full and open competi-
 135. 15 U.S.C. § 637(a) (2006); see 48 C.F.R. §§ 6.204, 19.800 (2006). For sec-
ondary policies, see the Small Business Research and Development Enhancement Act 
of 1992, 15 U.S.C. § 638 (2006), and the HUBZone Act of 1997, 15 U.S.C. §§ 631 
note, 657a (2006). 
 136. It is much different at the E.U. member state level. In the famous 
Burma/Massachusetts dispute, a secondary policy concern (political commitment) was 
included in the award criteria. See ARROWSMITH, supra note 1, at 343. 
 137. Gesetz gegen Wettbewerbsbeschränkungen [Act Against Restraints of Compe-
tition], June 27, 1957, BGBl. I 1081, July 12, 2005, BGBl. I 1954, available at 
http://bundesrecht.juris.de/bundesrecht/gwb/gesamt.pdf [hereinafter GWB]. An Eng-
lish translation of this law is available at the government Web site, 
http://www.bundeskartellamt.de/wEnglisch/download/pdf/06_GWB_7__Novelle_e.p
df. 
 138. GWB, supra note 137, art. 97(3) (English translation).  
 139. C. MARCHÉS PUB., art. 54(I) (Fr.) (English translation, Legifrance (govern-
ment) Web site, http://195.83.177.9/code/liste.phtml?lang=uk&c=28&r=1411 (last 
visited Jan. 28, 2007)). 
 140. European Parliament and Council Directive 2004/18/EC, 2004 O.J. (L 134) 
114 art. 53(1)(a). 
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tion after exclusion of sources.” As pointed out above, the frequency of 
the use of the designated competitive tendering procedure has de-
creased significantly in recent times. Carrying out secondary policies 
through designation has therefore become difficult. To counter this in 
the future, the author believes that the language of the relevant laws 
and regulations can be interpreted to include secondary policy con-
cerns as part of the comprehensive evaluation standard. Indeed, the 
APQA provides that “various factors in addition to price should be 
considered to ensure the quality of public works”141 and the interpreta-
tion of the vague term “various factors” has not yet been made clear. 
The interpretation is likely to be influenced heavily by future practices. 
It cannot be denied that the APQA could bypass secondary policies, 
but one should remember that the Public Agency Order Act still exists. 
If concerns of secondary policies are included in the factors to be taken 
into account under the comprehensive evaluation method, Japan would 
be much different from the United States and the European Union with 
respect to this point. 
4. Monitoring and Bid Protests 
The more complicated the evaluation process to award contracts, the 
stronger the need to monitor procuring entities. Furthermore, the need 
to provide procedural protection of losing candidates to appeal, i.e., to 
make a bid protest, is also stronger. Although the APQA opened the 
door for flexibility and complexity in public works procurement, the 
necessary complementary monitoring and bid-protest mechanisms 
have not yet been sufficiently established. As mentioned previously, 
the existing monitoring and bid-protest institutions in Japan consist of 
part-time outsiders.142 Whether such institutions work well is doubtful. 
Due to the varying national schemes within the European Union, 
only a comparison between Japan and the United States is made 
here.143 In the United States, competition advocates144 and officials of 
 141. See APQA, supra note 9, art. 3(2). 
 142. See supra Part III.C.4. 
 143. The E.U. directive does not make concrete suggestions concerning the moni-
toring institutions or bid-protest procedures in the member states. The member states 
must decide these matters on an individual basis. It is therefore difficult to analyze the 
E.U. regimes concerning these matters comparatively with Japan and the United States 
because of the inconsistency among the E.U. member states. It should be noted, 
however, that there are several interesting points in the E.U. member states concerning 
monitoring institutions and bid-protest procedures. For example, in Germany, the 
specially-established office for bid protests is part of the Federal Cartel Office 
(Bundeskartellamt), equivalent to the Federal Trade Commission and the Antitrust 
Division of the Department of Justice in the United States, the Competition Director-
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the Offices of the Inspector General of the various government agen-
cies supervise government agency procurement activities.145 Notably, 
the Office of the Inspector General is a body highly independent from 
any other government agency, and controlled directly by the Presi-
dent.146 The officials of the Offices of the Inspector General and com-
petition advocates are the inside government officials.147 In the United 
States, therefore, public entities or officials monitor other public enti-
ties or officials. This clearly differs from the state of affairs in Ja-
pan.148
The U.S. Federal Acquisition Regulation,149 which comprehensively 
regulates federal procurement activities in the U.S., devotes an entire 
chapter to bid protests.150 Compared with Japan, it is remarkable that 
in the United States not only procuring entities but also the General 
Accountability Office, which is responsible for the public accounts, 
work as institutions handling bid protests.151 This means that a public 
entity checks another public entity as to bid protests as well as moni-
toring. In Japan, the Board of Audit,152 equivalent to the U.S. General 
Audit Office, does not play such a role. 
ate-General in the European Union, and the Fair Trade Commission in Japan. For 
German public procurement review procedures, see GWB, supra note 137, pt. IV, ch. 
2 (§§ 102–24). 
 144. 48 C.F.R. §§ 6.501, 6.502(b). 
 145. The Inspectors General serve generally to perform audits and investigations of 
their respective agencies’ operations and to promote, among other things, economy 
and efficiency. 5 U.S.C. app. 3 §§ 2, 4 (2006). 
 146. 5 U.S.C. app. 3 § 3(a)–(b) (2006). The position of Inspector General was 
established by the Inspector General Act of 1978, 5 U.S.C. app. 3 § 3 (2006). 
 147. See 48 C.F.R. pt. 6, sec. 5 (2006); 5 U.S.C. app. 3 (2006). 
 148. To avoid expanding the analysis in this article beyond its intended scope, the 
author has intentionally excluded references to court cases involving bid protests as a 
comparative analysis of such cases would be very complex. It should be noted that, 
because going to court is the last step in making a bid protest, these must not be ig-
nored. The author intends to write another article with a comparative analysis of 
bid-protest litigation in the future. Here, the author only points out that the courts 
strongly tend to dismiss the claims of unsuccessful candidates in Japan. It might be 
interesting to compare the state of affairs respecting this issue in Japan with those of 
the U.S. and E.U. countries. 
 149. 48 C.F.R. pts. 1–53 (2006). 
 150. 48 C.F.R. pt. 33 (2006). 
 151. See 48 C.F.R. § 33.104 (2006) (“Protests to GAO”); see also 4 C.F.R. pt. 21 
(2007) (“Bid Protest Regulations [GAO]”).  
 152. The Board of Audit was established by Kaikei kensain ho [Board of Audit 
Act], Law No. 73 of 1947. 
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B. The Hurdles for Japanese Laws to Implement the WTO-GPA 
As far as public works are concerned, the Japanese public procure-
ment regimes have become closer to the framework of the WTO-GPA 
since the APQA was enacted. Namely, both open tendering and selec-
tive tendering under the WTO-GPA,153 which respectively correspond 
to open competitive tendering and designated competitive tendering in 
Japan, permit a dialogue between procuring entities and candidates 
similar to the method sanctioned by the APQA in Japan.154 Addition-
ally, the APQA and the WTO-GPA are in accord on the point that 
there is no disproportionate emphasis on price in the contractor award 
procedure.155
Despite some similarities as described above, there are also some 
differences between the two. For example, in the WTO-GPA, only 
limited tendering 156  is treated as an exception, whereas not only 
non-competitive tendering, the equivalent of limited tendering, but also 
designated competitive tendering are considered to be exceptions under 
the Japanese laws.157 Furthermore, as aforementioned, the Japanese 
regimes include an estimated price system which does not exist under 
the WTO-GPA. 
This comparison is only a superficial analysis. The more important 
matter is how the Japanese regimes work effectively in implementing 
the WTO-GPA. The harmonization of the frameworks is merely a tool 
for that purpose. There are still major hurdles to be overcome in the 
Japanese public procurement regimes, two of which will now be ad-
dressed. 
The main targets of the WTO-GPA for free and fair international 
trade can be said to be: (1) non-discrimination, (2) transparency, and 
(3) removal of unnecessary trade restrictions.158 The APQA should be 
complemented by legal rules implementing these targets and their 
practices. However, entry barriers can still be set up and procuring en-
tities can still arbitrarily treat certain candidates unfairly even as part 
of the flexible and complex processes established pursuant to the 
APQA. In fact, the complexity of the processes actually reduces their 
 153. GPA, supra note 1, art. VII (3)(a), (b). 
 154. Id. art. XIV.  
 155. Id. art. XIII(4)(b). 
 156. Id. art. VII(3)(c) (“Limited tendering procedures are those procedures where 
the entity contacts suppliers individually, only under the conditions specified in Ar-
ticle XV [of the GPA].”). 
 157. See supra Part II.A. 
 158. ARROWSMITH, supra note 1, at 168–71. 
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transparency. To overcome these problems is thought to be the real 
target for implementing the WTO-GPA. This is the first hurdle. 
A second hurdle is the treatment of secondary policies. As noted 
above, it is probable that in the future, secondary policy concerns will 
be considered as part of the comprehensive evaluation method.159 Re-
garding the WTO-GPA, there has been a debate about the approved 
range of secondary policies under Article 23(2).160 The greater the 
importance procuring entities attach to secondary policies, the higher 
the trade barriers will be. This causes a conflict with the aims of the 
WTO-GPA. Whatever the secondary policies it allows to be consid-
ered, the Japanese government must respond sufficiently to the need to 
assure transparency concerning practices under the APQA. 
V. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
Japan is now at the halfway point in undertaking reforms of its gov-
ernment procurement regimes. It is uncertain how the APQA will be 
enforced in practice because of its short history since enactment. The 
public’s tendency to regard only price as a credible standard even in 
the public works field is still deeply rooted in Japanese society. The 
possibility that the price-only competition method will continue to be 
the primary one used in fields other than public works in the future 
cannot be denied. 
This article presented a comparative analysis of the relevant legal 
provisions in Japan, the United States, and the European Union and 
pointed out several matters Japan should keep in mind when imple-
menting the WTO-GPA. Considering its present industrial and social 
environments, how will Japan advance toward this goal? A great 
number of hurdles must be overcome. 
 159. See supra pt. III.C.1. 
 160. ARROWSMITH, supra note 1, at 345–46. 
